K. Krasnow Waterman
We have a research grant from IARPA -- Intelligence AdvancedResearch Projects Activity -- and we are to produce a privacy accountability scenario relevant to the Intelligence Community.
During multiple meetings with potential government users, they raised the following subjects as of interest in a future scenario:
This scenario is a fictional compilation of a number of US and foreign news events:
Private data: A man in a vehicle was observed apparently taking photographs of security guards at a private nuclear power plant. One of the security guards took photographs of the man and his car and turned them over to the local police. The photographs provide a clear picture of the vehicle and its license plate, but a blurry photo of the man.
State data: The local police looked up the license plate and then ran the owner's name in NCIC; the owner was a twice-convicted arsonist. The local police then looked up the owner's drivers license. Because the security guard photo was blurry it was not possible to match the drivers license photo; however, there was nothing in the drivers license photo that ruled out a match. The local police opened a criminal case investigation and created an ISE-SAR with all of the above information. The ISE-SAR is available to other local and federal agencies through the Central Florida Intelligence Exchange (CFIX).
Federal data: An FBI analyst
(j) General exemptions
The head of any agency may promulgate rules, in accordance with the requirements (including general notice) of sections 553(b)(1), (2), and (3), (c), and (e) of this title, to exempt any system of records within the agency from any part of this section except subsections (b), (c)(1) and (2), (e)(4)(A) through (F), (e)(6), (7), (9), (10), and (11), and (i) if the system of records is--
(2) maintained by an agency or component thereof which performs as its principal function any activity pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws, including police efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or to apprehend criminals, and the activities of prosecutors, courts, correctional, probation, pardon, or parole authorities, and which consists of (A) information compiled for the purpose of identifying individual criminal offenders and alleged offenders and consisting only of identifying data and notations of arrests, the nature and disposition of criminal charges, sentencing, confinement, release, and parole and probation status; (B) information compiled for the purpose of a criminal investigation, including reports of informants and investigators, and associated with an identifiable individual; or (C) reports identifiable to an individual compiled at any stage of the process of enforcement of the criminal laws from arrest or indictment through release from supervision.
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are--
(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
(b) Whenever criminal intelligence information or criminal investigative information held by a non-Florida criminal justice agency is available to a Florida criminal justice agency only on a confidential or similarly restricted basis, the Florida criminal justice agency may obtain and use such information in accordance with the conditions imposed by the providing agency.
 US DOJ, US DHS, & Global Justice, Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era , p. 2
 Thomas E. McNamara, Information Sharing Environment(ISE), Functional Standard (FS), Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR), Version 1.0 , 5.g, January 25, 2008.
 E.g., McNamara, I.A., p. 5, & IV, pp. 12-23.
 McNamara, 5.f., p. 2.
 McNamara, II.E, p. 11.
 McNamara, IV, PrivacyFieldIndicator, p. 23.
 McNamara, IV, ReportPurgeDate & ReportPurgeReviewDate, p. 23
 5 USC Section 552a (a)(2)